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ABSTRACT
Migration movements to Europe, triggered by dramatic political and so-
cial developments in North Africa and the Middle East, have contributed to 
a decrease in the level of security in the European Union and to the crisis of 
this organisation. This article addresses the issue of migration in the context of 
the phenomenon of neo-nomadism and its effects on the policies of the mem-
ber states of the European Union as well as its institutions and agencies. The 
consequences of neo-nomadism are analysed in regard to  the EU’s “extended 
borderland” on the example of the activities of the European Border and Coast 
Guard Agency (Frontex) in the Central Mediterranean. Frontex’s joint opera-
tions “Triton” and “Themis” serve as a useful frame of reference in examining 
this agency’s “agent power” expressed in terms of activities concerning migra-
tory movements in the EU’s “extended borderland”. The hypothesis developed 
in this article holds that the dynamics of mobility resulting from the specific 
features of neo-nomadism activates the “agent power” of entities involved in 
mobility and border management in two forms: inclusionary, for humanitarian 
reasons, and exclusionary, for the sake of security. As an agency responsible for 
supporting the management of the EU’s external borders and implementing 
return policy, Frontex has concentrated its agent power on securing territory, 
borders and population at the expense of humanitarian search-and-rescue op-
erations. Joint operations “Triton” and “Themis” have clearly highlighted the 
trend towards an exclusionary approach to migrants. Post-functionalism refer-
ring to the original conceptualisation put forward by Hooghe and Marx is the 
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theoretical framework adopted in this study. The research method is qualitative, 
based on desk research including the analysis and interpretation of primary and 
secondary sources.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The intense migration flows to Europe, triggered by the developments 
in MENA (Middle East and North Africa) countries (Arab Spring, war in 
Syria, ISIS expansion, chaos in Libya), have affected the European integra-
tion system and heavily contributed to the identity crisis of the European 
Union. As a result, it has been security that has framed all border issues and 
has had a tremendous impact on migration and mobility in the EU. How-
ever, the migration crisis in its essence has been a hyper-real representation 
of biopolitical processing triggered by wireless communication networks, 
transportation opportunities provided by criminal facilitators and organ-
ised search-and-rescue humanitarian activities. As a  result, neo-nomadic 
forms of mobility mushroomed at the height of the migration crisis in 
2015-2016 and prompted reactions from the European Union and its 
member states.
This paper stems from the assumption that neo-nomadic forms 
of mobility dominated the massive flow of migrants to Europe in the 
mid-2010s and provoked improvement of security policies and actions 
undertaken by the European Union and its member states during the 
migration crisis. One of the outcomes of the crisis was the transforma-
tion of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) towards 
a multi-purpose agent expressing its power in joint operations across the 
EU’s extended borderland. Frontex’s deployments, surveillance activities, 
operational assistance to national border guards and intelligence support, 
including criminal profiling, have manifested its aspiration, prompted 
by the European Commission, towards playing the role of security actor 
with regard to intense mobility of third-country nationals heading for the 
European Union.
Theoretical reflection expressed in this article is inspired by the 
postfunctionalist approach to the European integration proposed orig-
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inally by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks1. It claims that governance 
and politics are determined not by their functionality but by emotion-
al resonance. Jurisdictions that people create express their national, re-
gional, and local identities2. The premise of postfunctionalism is that 
politicisation leads to constraining dissensus which limits governance by 
producing a  mismatch of functionally efficient and politically feasible 
solutions3. The concept of neo-nomadism, proposed and developed by 
Anthony D’Andrea, serves as a point of reference, critically assessed and 
modified for the purposes of the reported research because of a different 
field (security studies instead of cultural studies and ethnography) and 
cognitive perspective (postfunctionalism instead of poststructuralism). 
D’Andrea, building on Braidotti, claims that “Neo-nomadism develops 
as a war machine that opposes the state, unleashing forces of chromat-
ic variation that breaks down molar formations, deteriorating identities 
into the smooth space of multiplicity”4. The migration crisis in the EU 
has provided numerous evidences of anti- and beyond-the-state activities 
among the neo-nomadic cohorts which have resembled exceptional con-
ditions accompanying war (refuge, displacement, points of no-return, 
massive scale, variety). These phenomena aggregated along the EU’s ex-
ternal borders in the area which may be specified as an “extended bor-
derland”. The concept of the extended borderland serves as a tool for the 
description and analysis of a networked system of interconnected actors, 
rules and resources existing in vast communication, political, economic 
and territorial realms, blending strict institutionalised protective and se-
curity-oriented measures at the borders with social and cultural phenom-
1 Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Inte-
gration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus”, British Journal of Politi-
cal Science, 39(2009): 1-23. DOI:10.1017/S0007123408000409.
2 Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Arjan H. Schakel, Sandra Chapman Osterkatz, Sara 
Niedzwiecki, Sarah Shair-Rosenfield, Measuring Regional Authority: A Postfunctionalist 
Theory of Governance, Volume I, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 3.
3 See remarks by Frank Schimmelfennig, “European Integration in the Euro Crisis: 
The Limits of Postfunctio-nalism”, Journal of European Integration, 36(2014): 321-322. 
DOI:10.1080/07036337.2014.886399.
4 Anthony D’Andrea, Global Nomads. Techno and New Age as transnational coun-
tercultures in Ibiza and Goa, Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2007, 31.
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ena determining construction of boundaries. Institutional actors present 
in the extended borderland have to possess special powers and capabil-
ities to address contrasting identities and tangled itineraries. Therefore, 
Brunet-Jailly and Dupeyron’s “agent power” concept will be employed to 
analyse border-security policies and actions undertaken by the European 
Border and Coast Guard Agency. Frontex’s agent power will be tested 
on the example of its operational activities in the Central Mediterrane-
an, with a particular emphasis put on two joint operations: Triton and 
Themis. The paper proceeds as follows: the first section discusses the 
theoretical and conceptual framework of neo-nomadic mobility, refer-
ring to a  classical ethnographic approach, post-modernist philosophi-
cal reflection and novel interpretation offered by Anthony D’Andrea. 
The next part offers a glimpse on the concept of  extended borderland, 
highlighting the element of post-functionalist identities of actors and 
agents active in that area. The final part begins with a brief description 
of theoretical bases of the term “agent power”, followed by a discussion 
of empirical examples of activities undertaken by Frontex in the Central 
Mediterranean part of the EU’s extended borderland.
2. NEO-NOMADIC MOBILITY
From the very outset of human civilisation, mobility and sedentarism 
have competed as domi-nant forms of spatial organisation of societies, 
and have often complemented each other. Hunters and gatherers have 
coexisted with herders and farmers and  those experienced with sedentary 
agriculture. The world determined by space, movement, speed and natu-
ral environment has been the domain of mobile communities of pastoral 
nomads.
The role of nomadism in the early stages of human civilisation has been 
studied thoroughly since the groundbreaking monographic book by Ana-
toly M. Khazanov. Irrespective of the assumption that nomadism is identi-
fied by pastoralism, Khazanov’s notable insight about indigenous mobile 
populations shows that “the important phenomenon of nomadism [...] re-
ally consists in its indissoluble and necessary connection with the outside 
world; that is to say, with societies which have different economic and so-
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cial systems”5. His definition of nomadism is quite reductionist6. According 
to him, nomadism “embraces itinerant communities who travel from place 
to place, but does not include societies practising transhumance and who 
live in a permanent and fixed habitat”7.While Khazanov made an outstand-
ing contribution to history, sociology and ethnography of nomadic socie-
ties,  nomadism as a form of mobility was elevated to the level of a philo-
sophical reflection by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Their famous 
treatise on “nomadology”, included in the collection Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia8, counterposed open-ended fluctuating no-
mad space to the sedentary state gridded by fixed paths in a  closed en-
trenched area. For the purpose of this article, the concepts of nomadism 
and “nomadology” and its inherent connection to the “war machine” are 
not taken into consideration. Rather, the way how Deleuze and Guattari 
perceive the nomad through his ties to territory/space, time, (military) 
force, speed and communication seems to be relevant and inspiring. The 
French philosophers point to the principle of territoriality, as opposed to 
movement, in the constitution of nomadism. They argue: “The nomad dis-
tributes himself in a smooth space, he occupies, inhabits, holds that space; 
that is his territorial principle. It is therefore false to define the nomad by 
movement”9. Therefore, territory is the physical dimension of the nomad’s 
movement in the non-delimited space. The topography of his routine and 
extraordinary paths and itineraries is determined  by interconnected pa-
rameters of spatial (and temporal) orientation and positioning. Deleuze 
5 Anatoly M. Khazanov, Nomads and the Outside World, transl. by Julia Crookenden, 
2nd ed., Madison and London: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1994, 3.
6 Khazanov maintained that, based on differences in economic production, only 
mobile extensive pastoralists can be considered as nomads; hunter–gatherers who do not 
lead a sedentary life are just ‘wanderers’. See Khazanov, op. cit., 15-16.
7 Ibidem.
8 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schiz-
ophrenia, transl. by Brian Massumi, Minneapolis and London: University of Minne-
sota Press, 1987, section 12: “1227: Treatise on Nomado-logy:—The War Machine”, 
351-423. Interestingly enough, this very same chapter, in Massumi’s translation, was pub-
lished separately (and preemptively to the English edition of Mille Plateaux) as a  small 
book titled Nomado-logy: The War Machine, New York and Brooklyn, NY: Semiotext(e), 
1986. I will refer to the latter publication hereinafter.
9 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Nomadology, op. cit., 51.
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and Guattari put it this way: „The nomad, nomad space, is localised and 
not delimited. What is both limited and limiting is striated space, the rela-
tive global: it is limited in its parts which are assigned constant directions, 
are oriented in relation to one another, divisible by boundaries, and may 
interlink; what is limiting (limes or wall, and no longer boundary) is this 
aggregate in relation to the smooth spaces it “contains,” the growth of 
which it slows or prevents, and which it restricts or places outside”10. Hence, 
according to the French philosophers, the essence of nomadism is an un-
stoppable presence on a territory along a trajectory which distributes peo-
ple in an open space without borders. The sublime and sophisticated inter-
pretation of nomadism offered by Deleuze and Guattari may be juxtaposed 
with a contemporary legal and cultural perspective presented by Jérémie 
Gilbert. Typically for the modern approach to nomadism, he has conceived 
it as a form of mobility organised around both natural determinants (terri-
tory, climate, land) and cultural prerequisites but subject to the rational 
choice principle and long-term strategic blueprints. According to Gilbert, 
“Nomadism denotes a mobile way of life organised around cyclical or sea-
sonal patterns. Nomadism refers to groups of people who practise spatial 
mobility to enhance their well-being and survival. [...] While, in the past, 
nomadic peoples were often seen as ‘wandering’ across the lands with no 
specific patterns, it is now widely recognised that mobility is the result of 
a rational and efficient strategy for harvesting scarce resources spread une-
venly across wide territories. Mobility is both a distinctive source of cultur-
al identity and a management strategy for sustainable land use and conser-
vation”11. Studying the legal, social and cultural status of various nomadic 
communities around the world, Gilbert has underlined their variety and 
diversity of forms, types and categories. He argues what links so many dif-
ferent forms of nomadism is  “the idea of a cultural, social, and economic 
pattern of mobility from one place to another”12. Routine practices of no-
madism entail mobility not only in social and economic terms but also raise 
the issue of migration, borders and law (domestic and international). Con-
10 Ibidem, 53-54.
11 Jérémie Gilbert, Nomadic Peoples and Human Rights, Abingdon and New York: 
Routledge, 2014, 3.
12 Ibidem, 5.
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temporary nomadism is more a mobile residency than unrestricted wander-
ing. Therefore, nomadic people depend on legal norms, administrative pro-
cedures and state control13. They fall under the same regulatory regimes as 
sedentary population changing from time to time its residence, i.e. the mi-
grants. The question whether nomads constitute one of the categories of 
migrants has been widely discussed in the scholarship on nomadism. 
Deleuze and Guattari have clarified: “The nomad is not at all the same as 
the migrant; for the migrant goes principally from one point to another, 
even if the second point is uncertain, unforeseen, or not well localised. But 
the nomad goes from point to point only as a consequence and as a factual 
necessity; in principle, points for him are relays along a trajectory”14. For 
Khazanov migration was a “one-way ticket” essentially different from other 
forms of mobility, such as wandering, shifting, pastoral mobility, industrial 
mobility and mobility of peripatetic ethno-professional groups15. MacKay 
et al. differentiate nomads from migrants with reference to laws, regulations 
and jurisdiction of the modern Westphalian state. Nomads are pre-state 
actors, their identity originates outside the state and its territorial dimen-
sion, they avoid a  formal attachment to property, location (address) and 
authority. Migrants, on their part, organise themselves according to nation-
al legislations and international (humanitarian) norms16. Another signifi-
cant divergence concerns the “economic rationality” of mobility. Migrants 
tend to optimise their itineraries and calculate the overall travel costs. Their 
own experience and lessons shared by others, as well as historic collective 
memory, do matter for making the decision to activate mobility.  Nomads 
“have no history; they only have a geography”17. Therefore, they flexibilise 
territory, fluctuate between different resources, natural topographic land-
marks and cultural imperatives. Deleuze and Guattari observe that: “No-
madic waves or flows of deterritorialisation go from the central layer to the 
periphery, then from the new center to the new periphery, falling back to 
13 See interesting remarks by Joseph MacKay, Jamie Levin, Gustavo de Carvalho,Kris-
tin Cavoukian, Ross Cuthbert, “Before and after borders: The nomadic challenge to sover-
eign territoriality”, International Politics, 51(2014): 101–123. DOI:10.1057/ip.2013.24.
14 Ibidem.
15 Anatoly M. Khazanov, op. cit., xxxiii.
16 Joseph MacKay et al., op. cit., 103-104.
17 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Nomadology, op. cit., 73.
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the old center and launching forth to the new”18. Meanwhile, migrants are, 
willingly or forcefully, determined to reorganise their existence in accord-
ance with given geographical and sociocultural factors which tend to reter-
ritorialise the migrants’ previous predominantly sedentary motivations and 
lifestyles. Rosi Braidotti, echoing Deleuze and Guattari, states that “global 
migration is a molar line of segmentation or reterritorialisation that con-
trols access to various forms of mobility and immobility”19. Apart from the 
contemporary discussion on differences and similarities between migration, 
mobility and nomadism, a new reflection has emerged with regard to ef-
fects of globalisation, technological acceleration, cultural diffusion, spirit-
uality and consumerism. Anthony Albert Fischer D’Andrea has introduced 
the concept of “neo-nomadism” as a form of a dialogue between global and 
critical studies concerning linkages between spatial displacement, econom-
ic strategies and modes of self-identity and subjectivity formation. Neo-no-
madism resembles the traditional nomadic organisation in the usage of 
mobility as “a  tactic of evasion from dominant sedentary apparatuses”20. 
Neo-nomadism is a global phenomenon driven by technological, material 
and cultural factors enabling to integrate mobility into economic strategies 
and expressive lifestyles. It reflects some outcomes of global hypermobility 
generating transnational flows which deterritorialize societies while inter-
connecting them globally21. In D’Andrea’s conceptualisation, neo-nomad-
ism “addresses new forms of identity that are based, not on sameness or 
fixity, but rather on a principle of metamorphosis (chromatic variation). In 
other words, neo-nomadic lifestyles, subjectivities and identities may be 
addressed as expressions and agents of the postidentitarian predicament of 
globalisation”22. Acknowledging high utility and inspirational value of 
18  Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, op. cit., 53. The authors 
make reference to a fascinating book by Pia Laviosa-Zambotti, Origini e diffusione della 
civilità (Milan: C. Marzorati, 1947) and her conception of waves and flows from center to 
periphery, and of nomadism and migrations (nomadic flows).
19 Rosi Braidotti, Nomadic theory: the portable Rosi Braidotti, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2011, 244.
20 Anthony D’Andrea, Global Nomads, op. cit., 25.
21 Anthony D’Andrea Neo‐Nomadism: A  Theory of Post‐Identitarian Mobility in 
the Global Age, Mobilities, 1(2006): 97, DOI: 10.1080/17450100500489148.
22 Anthony D’Andrea Global Nomads, op. cit., 6.
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D’Andrea’s reflections, this is to focus the attention on today’s nomadism 
seen from a  different angle. While D’Andrea has observed the cases of 
neo-nomadism as countercultural lifestyles adopted voluntarily by “expatri-
ates-by-choice”, a closer look has been taken at “migrants-by-necessity” and 
“refugees-by-force”. Contrary to D’Andrea who points to global hubs of 
hypermobility and entertainment for “expressive expatriates” (such as Ibiza, 
Goa, Bali, Ko Pangnan, Bahia, Byron Bay, San Francisco and Pune)23, this 
is to point to migrant camps and detention facilities for “aliens” and dis-
placed people (such as Aguadilla, Laredo, El Paso, Samos, Lesvos, Tripoli, 
Zawiya, Iğdir  and  Osmaniye). A  valuable observation by D’Andrea de-
serves a special attention: “The primary determination of nomads is to oc-
cupy and hold a  smooth space: it is this aspect that determines them as 
nomad (essence)”24. The recent  experience of migrants from the Middle 
East, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa or Central America has proven this 
principle. Neo-nomads seek a temporary place of  residence as a site of re-
covery, rest and humanitarian aid. Stopovers serve a better coordination 
and an improved communication as key elements of the migratory under-
taking. Sometimes, temporary shelters are used for reconstruction of mi-
grant itineraries and improved preparedness for a  further journey. In 
a ty-pical picture of global neo-nomadism, refugee camps maintained by 
international humanitarian organisations ensure minimal humanitarian 
standards of assistance and protection. Disembarkation points and hot-
spots as well as immigrant camps and migrant detention facilities, estab-
lished by the authorities of a transit or a host state, offer rescue and main-
tenance of the physical integrity of migrant travellers. They also strongly 
influence itinerants’ identities and lifestyles, petrifying Neo-nomadic traits 
of their status, such as temporariness, liquidity, legal uncertainty and “mo-
bilisation for mobility”. Movement, journey and transit which lie at the 
heart of neo-nomadism, and which determine behaviour of many contem-
porary migrants, are shaped by spatial, territorial and institutional factors 
emerging along and across migratory routes. A confrontation of neo-no-
madic practices with natural and formal impediments arises in border-
lands. The following section offers an analytical insight in the concept of 
23 Anthony D’Andrea, Neo-Nomadism, op. cit., 100.
24 Ibidem, 101.
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borderland as an area where migrant itineraries are severely affected and 
modified by state institutions and non-governmental actors, including in-
ternational agencies which, as in the case of Frontex, seek to modify cus-
tomary rules and available practices with the aim of working out synerget-
ic interdependencies.
3. THE EXTENDED BORDERLAND
The concept of borderland has occupied a prominent place in history, 
human geography, geopolitics, cultural studies, and – quite recently – soci-
ology, international relations and security studies. It used to be accompa-
nied by, or juxtaposed with, such terms as frontier, border, confine, bound-
ary, and borderline25. Being a concept used in various strands of research, 
having different meanings and contexts, it has resisted a uniform approach, 
a clear-cut definition and a syncretic connotation. As a part of border stud-
ies, it has been shaped by cultural differences, crossborder mobilities and 
multi-lingual descriptions and interpretations. Regional peculiarities also 
have mattered, addressing historical, social, economic and political process-
es of state formation and nation-building strongly determined by geograph-
ical location and territorial orga-nisation.  Unlike in American tradition, 
established by Frederick Jackson Turner and Herbert Eugene Bolton, which 
has highlighted the process of transformation of borderlands into a bound-
ary between emerging nation-states26, the European concept of borderlands 
25 See Jeremy Adelman, Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, 
Nation-States, and the Peoples in between in North American History”, The American 
Historical Review, 104(1989): 814-841, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2650990; Etienne 
Balibar, “Europe as borderland”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 
27(2009): 190-215. DOI:10.1068/d13008; Idem, We, the People of Europe? Reflections 
on Transnational Citizenship, transl. by James Swenson, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2004, 219-221; David Newman, “Borders and Bordering: Towards an 
Interdisciplinary Dialogue”, European Journal of Social Theory, 9(2006): 171–186. DOI: 
10.1177/1368431006063331; Donnan Hastings, Thomas M. Wilson, Borders. Frontiers 
of Identity, Nation and State, Oxford – New York: Berg, 1999; Hilary Cunningham, Jo-
siah Heyman, “Introduction: Mobilities and Enclosures at Borders”, Identities, 11(2004): 
289-302. DOI: 10.1080/10702890490493509.
26 Jeremy Adelman, Stephen Aron, op. cit., 192-193. 
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is based on the constitutive relationship between territory, population, and 
sovereignty. Irrespective of regional specificities, borderlands refer to the 
geographical areas27 surrounding international borders. They reflect human 
mobility, economic activities, cultural connections and policy-driven secu-
rity concerns. They correspond to symbolic boundaries and  imaginative 
geographies which elicit “the cross-cultural intermixing of everyday border-
land life”28.They involve the issue of “the territorial exclusivity of the ‘na-
tion’-state”29 and, thereby, the administration of the territory through the 
control of cross-border and intra-borderland population mobility. Border-
lands are constructed around and determined by borders conceived as “the 
physical manifestation of the sovereignty of the nation and the power of the 
national state to secure that nation from harm”30. Borders are the institution 
of the state31 and belong to the structures of national security. Since borders 
are part of the territorial domain of the state, they come under sovereign 
jurisdiction of the relevant judicial institutions, as well as they are sites of 
security governance and law enforcement. As a result, they “are in fact arbi-
trary institutions, composed of other constituencies and smaller institutions, 
which are designed to break-up and manage the flow of items and personnel 
into and out of the state”32. Because of numerous factors generated by dy-
27  John Prescott applies the term “transition zone within which the boundary lies”. 
See: J.R.V. Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries, London: Allen & Unwin, 1987, 
5. Interestingly, Oscar J. Martínez uses the terms “border” and “borderland” interchange-
ably, with reference to the place or region. See Oscar J. Martínez, Border People: Life and 
Society in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands, Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1994, 5.
28 Matthew Sparke, “Borderlands”. In: The Dictionary of Human Geography, 
ed. Derek Gregory, Ron Johnston, Geraldine Pratt, Michael J.Watts, Sarah Whatmore, 
5th Edition, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, 53.
29 Malcolm Anderson, Frontiers. Territory and State Formation in the Modern 
World, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, 5.
30 Donnan Hastings, Thomas M. Wilson, “Ethnography, security and the ‘frontier 
effect’ in borderlands”. In: Borderlands. Ethnographic Approaches to Security, Power, and 
Identity, ed. Donnan Hastings, Thomas M. Wilson, Lanham, MD: University Press of 
America, 2010, 2.
31 See remarks by Anssi Paasi in: “The Political Geography of Boundaries at the End 
of the Millennium: Challenges of the Deterritorializing World”. In: Curtain of Iron and 
Gold: Reconstructing Borders and Scales of Interaction, ed. Heikki Esklinen, Ilkka Liika-
nen, Jukka Oksa, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999, 19-21.
32 Donnan Hastings, Thomas M. Wilson, Ethnography, security..., op. cit., 5.
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namic social, cultural and economic developments, borderlands are under 
stress33.  Globalisation has recently become the critical factor in producing 
stress at borders and within borderlands. Greater mobility, worldwide com-
munication, inter-regional transportation networks and global welfare ine-
qualities have brought about the intensified circulation of people and goods 
across the borders. This presumably unstoppable phenomenon has provoked 
various outcomes, including negative ones, perceived as threats and long-
term risks for order, stability and security of the states and their societies. It 
has also generated the “frontier effect” of borderlands as a result of “political 
actions and identifications that are dependent on the nations and states who 
meet, greet and contest their political futures at the limits of their sovereign-
ty and territory, and which by their very nature can only occur in border-
lands. This ‘frontier effect’ has many facets to it, but chief among them is the 
clear delineation of nation and state, of nationalism and statism at and across 
the border”34.The conceptualisation of borderlands, despite its complex the-
oretical bases and the increasing explanatory power, has to be confronted 
with new migratory phenomena in Europe, of unprecedented scale and di-
versity, provoking consequences for politics, security and social life in the 
European Union and its neighbouring regions. Security policy improvement 
in result of the migration crisis in Europe, especially in the face of risks and 
threats at the EU’s external borders, as well as anxieties and unease on cultur-
al and mental boundaries, has called for novel approaches and concepts seek-
ing to offer a fresh insight in the complexities of contemporary borderlands. 
One of such theoretical proposals, which is applied in this article, is the 
concept of extended borderland framed by Artur Gruszczak35. It is built on 
Oscar Martínez’s complex set of ‘paradigms’ highlighting dynamics and 
complexity of interactions and synergies of cross-border movements36. 
33  See: Borderlands under stress, ed. Martin Pratt, Janet Allison Brown, The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2000.
34 Donnan Hastings, Thomas M. Wilson, Ethnography, security ..., op. cit., 10.
35 Artur Gruszczak, “European Borders in Turbulent Times: The case of the Central 
Mediterranean ‘Extended Borderland’”,  Politeja, 5(2017): 23-45. DOI: 10.12797/Polite-
ja.14.2017.50.02.
36 Oscar J. Martínez, “The Dynamics of Border Interaction. New Approaches to Bor-
der Analysis”. In: Global Boundaries. World Boundaries, ed. Clive H. Schofield, vol. 1, 
London–New York: Routledge, 1994, 2.
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Martínez has distinguished four types of borderlands: (1) alienated, (2) co-
existent, (3) interdependent, and (4) integrated37. This taxonomy has been 
enriched by Gruszczak who adds a fifth paradigm, that of extended border-
land. It blends strict, institutionalised protective and security-oriented 
measures at the borders with social and cultural phenomena determining 
the construction of boundaries38.This division corresponds with Hassner’s 
distinction between fixed borders and moving borderlands39. In addition, 
extended borderlands address the issue of “porosity” of borders in a selective 
way, including mechanisms of deterrence and border sealing as well as ac-
tive forward presence and rapid reaction capabilities. The extended border-
land is replete with a host of actors (local/national, borderland/cross-bor-
der, international and transnational) performing the whole variety of roles, 
functions and tasks within a given borderland. Their competences some-
times overlap, sometimes clash, which results in the emergence of a specific 
dense networked environment based on symbiotic coexistence. It incorpo-
rates agent power of individual ties and forces, broad social processes fram-
ing individual actions, norms and institutions (formal and informal) as well 
as culture and identity (self-awareness) of a  borderland40. This coincides 
with the following observation made by Hastings and Wilson “[...] in bor-
derlands there are processes taking place, in some cases because of the exist-
ence of borders themselves, that involve people and institutions who are in 
vital relationships with people and institutions of other ethnic groups and 
nations across the borderline (as well as with people within the state, out-
side the border zone)”41.The extended borderland is a self-referential (auto-
poietic) system of interconnected actors, rules and resources existing in vast 
37 Oscar J. Martínez, Border People, op. cit., 6-10.
38 See Klaus Eder, “Europe’s Borders. The Narrative Construction of the Bounda-
ries of Europe”, European Journal of Social Theory, 9(2006): 255-271. DOI: 10.1177/ 
1368431006063345.
39 Pierre Hassner, “Fixed Borders or Moving Borderlands? A New Type of Border for 
a New Type of Entity”. In: Europe Unbound. Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of 
the European Union, ed. Jan Zielonka, London–New York: Routledge, 2002.
40 See Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, Bruno Dupeyron, “Introduction. Borders, Border-
lands, and Porosity”. In: Borderlands. Comparing Border Security in North America and 
Europe, ed. Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2007, 1.
41 Donnan Hastings, Thomas M. Wilson, “Ethnography, security...”, op. cit., 7.
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communication, political, economic and – last but not least – territorial 
realms. The latter means that the boundaries of extended borderlands are 
not confined to a delimited territory, even if it is administratively estab-
lished42. Due to the networked architecture of the extended borderland, its 
boundaries move beyond administrative/territorial frontiers. Spontaneous 
movements and diverse forms of reciprocity emerge as a consequence of 
synergetic connections between the actors who expect benefits of arbitra-
tion in situations of conflict or feud. The concept of the extended border-
land highlights the importance of multiple actors present there, their inter-
ests and roles as well as interconnected activities undertaken with regard to 
overall strategy, general objectives or specific goals and selected targets. 
Symbiotic relationships and synergetic connections emerge in horizontal 
and vertical dimensions. From the first perspective, state actors seek to 
demonstrate institutional efficiency and political legitimacy of their admin-
istrative and policy-oriented measures through intense interactions with 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), local authorities, business enti-
ties and civil rights activists. Societal actors (NGOs, civic organisations) 
engage in grass-root initiatives aiming to improve communication between 
divergent agents, distribute available resources and provide humanitarian 
assistance for borderlands as well as incoming “others”. Illegal operators 
(criminals, smugglers, fraudsters) intensify their illicit activities through the 
exploitation of deficits of state power, weaknesses of legal and institutional 
arrangements, as well as openness and helpfulness of civil society actors. In 
the vertical dimension, synergy is produced on state level, between state 
representatives in international institutions, government officials, and local 
civil servants seconded to the borderland. In the societal domain, a close 
coordination and cooperation is established among global advocacy groups, 
international NGOs and grass-root activists. Illegal operators build entan-
gled undercover connections, linking petty lawbreakers and individual 
smugglers with local criminal networks and transnational criminal organi-
sations involved in large-scale, global, polymorphous crime. 
The dense network of interconnected and often interdependent actors 
is stretched across physical barriers and geographical boundaries, tending 
to blur divisions between territorial units and respective jurisdictions. The 
42 Artur Gruszczak, “European Borders...”, op. cit., 28.
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extended borderland epitomises the complex ecosystem of mobility and 
neo-nomadism in the era of globalisation. 
4. FRONTEX’S AGENT POWER: JO TRITON AND JO THEMIS
The dynamics of migration management, bordering practices and se-
curity policy improvement measures affects the actors’ performance and 
stimulates directly the agent power of individual interactions in a border-
land. The notion “agent power” has been promoted by Emmanuel Bru-
net-Jailly and Bruno Dupeyron in their research on borderlands. They have 
advanced a thesis that agent power, in its variable expressions, is a key to 
understand borders and borderlands in historical and contemporary per-
spectives43. The agency and the agent power are socially-embedded capaci-
ties to react to various situations and occurrences in such a way that helps 
an agent preserve identity, integrity and position. As such, the agent power 
reflects human activities, usually manifested in broader social processes, 
cultural interactions and political decisions. The human factor, noticed 
in humanitarian actions and vitalist endeavours, interacts with market 
forces, government policies, cultural flows and security measures. This is 
manifested in a specific way at borders, across boundaries and within bor-
derlands. According to Brunet-Jailly and Dupeyron, “[...]borders emerge 
as the historically and geographically variable expressions of human ties 
(agent power or agency), exercised within social structures of varying force 
and influence. It is the interplay and interdependence between individuals’ 
incentives to act and the surrounding structures (constructed social pro-
cesses that contain and constrain individual action, such as market forces, 
government activities, the culture and politics of a place) that determine 
the effectiveness of the formal border policy, and particularly of security 
policies”44.The latter aspect, underlined in the above section of this article, 
has been crucial for the formation and development of the EU policies 
in the extended borderland. The agent power has been demonstrated in 
state actions at their external borders and within their territories, with re-
43 Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, Bruno Dupeyron, op. cit., 4.
44 Ibidem, 1-2.
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gard to secondary movements of migrants. It has also been manifested 
in coordinated undertakings by the European Union which activated its 
supranational powers and policy-making capabilities with the intention 
of supporting the member states in their border management efforts. The 
deployment of the EU officials, acting on behalf of supranational institu-
tions and agencies, signified the projection of supranational agent pow-
er onto the contested borderland. This decision reflected Brunet-Jailly’s 
thought that “Borders and borderlands are defined by the historically and 
geographically variable expression of agent power exercised within institu-
tional structures of varying force and influence”45. The launch of several 
joint operations in the southern part of Europe, concentrated in coastal 
zones and maritime areas, may be interpreted as the exercise of surveillance 
powers and law enforcement capabilities in a borderland exposed to ele-
vated risks and direct threats. Therefore, the formal status of, and powers 
conferred to, a EU agency in charge of preparation, implementation and 
monitoring of operational activities acquire a particular significance. Ex-
ecutive aspects of the agent power have to reflect a transparent, legitimate 
and legal structure of the acting institution. This is a highly relevant feature 
of organised activities in borderlands because, as Brunet-Jailly argues, “[...] 
border policies and borderland security are highly dependent on the clear 
identification of the specific traits of agent power exercised within each 
borderland in question”46.
Frontex as a EU agency in the face of extraordinary developments at 
the EU’s external borders in the mid-2010s, described as the migration 
crisis,  was endowed with the special agent power in order to contribute 
to an effective coping with neo-nomadic mobility which has penetrat-
ed the EU’s extended borderland. Bearing in mind that neo-nomadism 
may lead to serious, sometimes far-reaching humanitarian and security 
consequences, Frontex’s agent power is demonstrated in various forms of 
its activities, ranging from humanitarian aid to return interventions and 
45 Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, “Conclusion: Borders, Borderlands, and Security:Euro-
pean and North American Lessons and Public Policy Suggestions”. In: Borderlands: com-
paring border security in North America and Europe, ed. Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, Ottawa: 
University of Ottawa Press, 2007, 354.
46 Ibidem.
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border policing47. Hence, referring once again to Brunet-Jailly’s conceptu-
alisation, the agent power should be perceived and interpreted as the inter-
play and interdependence between individuals and institutions acting in 
the surrounding structures determined by border policies and security ar-
rangements. Frontex’s agent power should be seen from a dual perspective: 
(1) inclusionary, focused on mobility as a human (humanitarian) issue; 
(2) exclusionary, targeting population as interpassive security subjects48. To 
begin an insight into Frontex’s dual agent power, it is necessary to present 
its normative bases and formal remits.
Frontex was established in October 2004 as the European Agency for 
the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of 
the Member States of the European Union. Based in Warsaw, it aimed to 
improve the integrated management of the external borders of the EU 
Member States, including research, training and risk analysis49. From the 
outset, Frontex has sought to combine technical assistance with operation-
al support for national border authorities50. Therefore, it has developed 
certain capabilities for a substantial reinforcement of protection, control, 
surveillance and an effective management of the EU’s external borders. 
These aspects of Frontex’s activities were strengthened in 2016, in the midst 
of an unprecedented migration crisis in Europe, by the establishment of 
47 Sergio Carrera, Valsamis Mitsilegas, Jennifer Allsopp, Lina Vosyliute, Policing Hu-
manitarianism: EU Policies Against Human Smuggling and their Impact on Civil Society, 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2019 (Kindle edition). 
48 See Evelyn Ruppert, “Population Objects: Interpassive Subjects”, Sociology, 
45(2011): 218-233. DOI: 10.1177/0038038510394027. Compare Paolo Cuttitta, “Delo-
calization, Humanitarianism, and Human Rights: The Mediterranean Border Between Ex-
clusion and Inclusion”, Antipode, 50(2018): 783–803. DOI: 10.1111/anti.12337.
49 Council of the European Union, “Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 
October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Co-
operation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union”, Official 
Journal of the European Union, L349(2004).
50 See remarks by Anneliese Baldaccini, “Extraterritorial Border Controls in the EU: 
The Role of Frontex in Operations at Sea”. In: Extraterritorial Immigration Control. Legal 
Challenges, ed. Bernard Ryan, Valsamis Mitsilegas, Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2010, 229-255. Also: Sarah Léonard, “EU border security and migration into 
the European Union: FRONTEX and securitisation through practices”, European Securi-
ty, 19(2010): 231-254. DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2010.526937.
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the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) and the transformation of 
Frontex into an EBCG agency51. Regulation 2016/1624 on the European 
Border and Coast Guard states explicitly that this agency was established 
in order to “ensure European integrated border management at the exter-
nal borders with a view to managing the crossing of the external borders 
efficiently”52. It is clarified in Article 4 that European integrated border 
management consists of several components, including border control, 
search and rescue activities, return operations, risk analyses, various forms 
of inter-agency and international cooperation, technical and technological 
measures, evaluation mechanisms and funding. Moreover, a  general in-
struction set in Article 1 tells that EBCG should address “potential future 
threats at [the external] borders, thereby contributing to addressing serious 
crime with a  cross-border dimension, to ensure a  high level of internal 
security within the Union [...].” 
Since its inception, Frontex has been involved in organisation and co-
ordination of joint operations53. They have aimed at supporting one or 
more member states in external border management and migration en-
forcement. Frontex has been authorised to deploy its staff and ensure the 
delivery of operational resources (personnel and equipment) by member 
states. Assistance has been provided for border control and surveillance 
and for joint return operations (sending illegal non-EU citizens back to 
their home countries), including forced return operations, voluntary de-
partures and readmissions. Against the background of numerous joint 
operations, Frontex-led activities at sea, especially in the Mediterranean 
51 See Jakub Bormio, “The reform of the Frontex Agency in the view of the princi-
pal-agent model. A case study of an attempt of supranationalisation”, Przegląd Europejski, 
3(2018):182-186. DOI: 10.5604/01.3001.0013.1961.
52 European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, “Regulation (EU) 
2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the 
European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and 
Council Decision 2005/267/EC”, Official Journal of the European Union, L251(2016).
53 In 2006, Frontex initiated seven joint operations; the next year, the respective fig-
ure leapt to 21. See Johannes Pollak, Peter Slominski, “Experimentalist but not Account-
able Governance? The Role of Frontex in Managing the EU’s External Borders”, West 
European Politics, 32(2009): 911. DOI: 10.1080/01402380903064754.
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Basin, have gained a  particular relevance, mostly due to the migration 
crisis of 2015-2016 and its aftermaths. Inclusionary and exclusionary as-
pects and effects of joint operations have raised many comments and con-
troversies, fuelled by the variety of Neo-nomadic practices observed, and 
dealt with, in the EU’s extended borderland. As an empirical illustration 
of these differing stances, two Frontex-led operations are discussed in the 
following: Joint Operation (JO) European Patrols Network (EPN) Tri-
ton and Joint Operation Themis. These two “multi-purpose” operations 
on the Mediterranean Sea have addressed security concerns caused by the 
massive, largely uncontrolled and partially criminalised flows of migrants 
to the European Union.
JO EPN Triton was planned as a border mission aiming to ensure 
effective surveillance and border control in the Mediterranean region 
and especially support Italian authorities in protecting Italy’s maritime 
borders from massive irregular crossing by migrants. It was focused on 
Italy’s territorial waters (within a  radius of 30 nautical miles from the 
Italian coast) and not international waters, where the largest number 
of migrants were exposed to the risk of drowning or death by dehydra-
tion. Moreover, due to the limited budget (roughly EUR 2.9 million per 
month) and modest member states’ assets (limited to two surveillance 
aircrafts and three patrol vessels)54, Frontex did not help improve the 
humanitarian situation in the Central Mediterranean despite the intense 
communication campaign placing strong emphasis on rescuing migrants 
from drowning. As  Carrera and others explained, JO Triton “did for-
mally engage in SAR [search-and-rescue] as a general obligation under 
international law, but only in the context of border controls and sur-
veillance activities and not as a part of its official mandate”55. Although 
it followed the Italian maritime operation “Mare Nostrum”, launched 
in October 2013, it did not supersede its humanitarian tasks. Only af-
ter a tragedy which occurred in the Central Mediterranean on 19 April 
54 European Commission, “Frontex Joint Operation ‘Triton’ – Concerted efforts 
to manage migration in the Central Mediterranean”, MEMO/14/566, October 7, 2014, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-566_en.htm.
55 Sergio Carrera et al., op. cit. Also: Eugenio Cusumano, “Migrant rescue as organ-
ized hypocrisy: EU maritime missions offshore Libya between humanitarianism and border 
control”, Cooperation and Conflict, 54(2019): 9. DOI: 10.1177/0010836718780175.
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2015, when a  Libyan trawler with over 850 migrants aboard sank in 
the high seas between Libya’s coast and the Italian island of Lampedusa, 
JO EPN Triton acquired a more humanitarian nature. Its mandate was 
broadened by supplementing surveillance and border protection with 
SAR activities in a far more extended zone: 138 nautical miles, stretching 
from the south of Sicily to Malta56. Moreover, the technical assets were 
strengthened and the budget doubled. Its capacity was enhanced with 
additional assets (offshore patrol vessels and patrol boats) and experts 
(for debriefing and screening) which increased SAR capabilities in the 
extended area. This inclusionary shift in Frontex’s agent power in the 
Central Mediterranean was all but unambiguous. According to one Brit-
ish newspaper, Fabrice Leggeri, Frontex’s Executive Director, declared 
some days before the change in the agency’s mandate: “Triton cannot 
be a  search-and-rescue operation. I mean, in our operational plan, we 
cannot have provisions for proactive search-and-rescue action. This is 
not in Frontex’s mandate, and this is in my understanding not in the 
mandate of the European Union”57. In addition, 11 member states did 
not deploy assets and seconded just a handful of national experts, which 
contributed to the overall poor equipment and small multinational staff 
involved in this operation. Repeated serious incidents, causing casualties 
and deaths, and the growing toll of migrant fatalities58 mounted pressure 
on the EU and its border and coast agency. Frontex’s Executive Director 
declared: “According to the mandate of Frontex, the primary focus of 
operation Triton will be border control, however I must stress that, as in 
56 Glenda Garelli, Charles Heller, Lorenzo Pezzani, Martina Tazzioli, “Shifting Bor-
dering and Rescue Practices in the Central Mediterranean Sea, October 2013–October 
2015”, Antipode, 50(2018): 816-817. DOI: 10.1111/anti.12371.
57 Patrick Kingsley and Ian Traynor, “EU borders chief says saving migrants’ lives 
‘shouldn’t be priority’ for patrols”, The Guardian, April 22, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/apr/22/eu-borders-chief-says-saving-migrants-lives-cannot-be-priority-for-patrols.
58 See Fatal Journeys Tracking Lives Lost during Migration, ed. Tara Brian, Frank 
Laczko Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2014; Ignacio Urquijo Sanchez, 
Julia Black, “Europe and the Mediterranean”. In: Fatal Journeys. Volume 3 Part 2 Improv-
ing Data on Missing Migrants, ed. Frank Laczko, Ann Singleton, Julia Black, Geneva: 
International Organization for Migration, 2017.
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all our maritime operations, we consider saving lives an absolute priority 
for our agency”59. 
Official data provided by Frontex has shown an impressive record of 
migrants rescued in JO Triton in the Central Mediterranean. 14,500 peo-
ple were saved in SAR actions in the first two months of the operation 
in 201460. In 2015, 155,000 migrants were registered, and in 2016 this 
number grew to 178,96161. In 2017 the number of registered irregular 
migrants dropped to 119,21362. The inclusionary discourse dominated in 
Frontex’s official statements, press releases and factsheets concerning JO 
Triton63. The rhetoric of humanitarian commitments was accompanied by 
exclusionary narrative of enhanced bordering and anti-crime actions. This 
is reflected in a report on Frontex’s activities in 2017: “In the framework 
of the multipurpose Joint Operation Triton 2017, increased patrolling ac-
tivities on the Eastern Sea areas of Italy and in the Ionian Sea resulted in 
a seizure of more than 30 tonnes of marijuana and in the arrest of approx. 
100 alleged facilitators from the 61 boats that had departed towards Italy 
from Turkey”64. This duality was reflected in the treatment of migrants 
stranded at sea. Those presenting a security threat were “intercepted” upon 
border surveillance activity; the others, being victims of human trafficker 
and facilitators, were rescued as a result of SAR activities65. As researchers 
and NGO activists argued, original operational choices limited Frontex’s 
proactive SAR undertakings66. Rescue activities often entailed criminal in-
59 Frontex, More technical support needed for Operation Triton, News Release, Oc-
tober 13, 2014, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/more-technical-sup-
port-needed-for-operation-triton-IKo5CG.
60 Frontex, Annual Activity Report 2014, Warsaw: Frontex, 2015, 15.
61 Frontex, Annual Activity Report 2016, Warsaw: Frontex, 2017, 81.
62 Frontex, Annual Activity Report 2017, Warsaw: Frontex, 2018, 85.
63 See Eugenio Cusumano, op. cit., 10-11. 
64 Frontex, Annual Activity Report 2017, op. cit., 19.
65 See Frontex, Frontex’ Annual Report on the implementation on the EU Regulation 
656/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing rules 
for the surveillance of the external sea borders, July 9, 2015, 5, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/libe/dv/frontex_report_2014/frontex_report_2014en.pdf .
66 See Eugenio Cusumano, op. cit.; Paolo Cuttitta, “Repoliticization Through Search 
and Rescue? Humanitarian NGOs and Migration Management in the Central Mediterra-
nean”, Geopolitics, 23(2018). DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2017.1344834.
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telligence and crime prevention methods and techniques. Frontex officers 
deployed in JO EPN Triton were assisting member states in screening mi-
grants, collecting personal data and information about migratory routes67.
The requirements of maximising and legitimising Frontex’s dual agent 
power augmented the tension between binding international norms of 
humanitarian law and security interests of the EU Member States, cop-
ing during all that time with migratory pressures and asylum claims. 
Measures to reduce immigration to the EU, particularly by developing 
and strengthening border protection means, were advocated by member 
states’ governments and the EU institutions. They contributed to the 
significant reduction of irregular migration and to redirection of main 
migratory routes, relieving partially the Central Mediterranean area. The 
deployment of another EU mission, EUNAVFOR MED Sophia, under 
the Common Security and Defence Policy, as well as NATO’s maritime 
Sea Guardian operation in the Mediterranean Sea gave an additional ev-
idence of politicisation of the EU’s extended borderland by securitisa-
tion through military and law-enforcement means. Frontex followed this 
suite and in February 2018 a decision was taken to phase out JO Triton, 
and replace it by Joint Operation Themis. In words of Frontex’s Execu-
tive Director, Fabrice Leggeri, “Operation Themis will better reflect the 
changing patterns of migration, as well as cross border crime. Frontex 
will also assist Italy in tracking down criminal activities, such as drug 
smuggling across the Adriatic”68. The priorities were clearly set, revealing 
a decisive shift in Frontex’s agent power: from blended inclusionary/ex-
clusionary setting to exclusionary-driven security-oriented venture. In an 
official communique issued by Frontex, it was pointed out that “Opera-
tion Themis also has a significant security component, include collection 
of intelligence and other steps aimed at detecting foreign fighters and oth-
er terrorist threats at the external borders”69. Fabrice Leggeri argued: “We 
67 Frontex, Meet Frontex Officers, March 7, 2018, https://frontex.europa.eu/me-
dia-centre/focus/meet-frontex-officers-iAbzRk.
68 Frontex, Frontex launching new operation in Central Med, News Release, Febru-
ary 1, 2018, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-launching-new-
operation-in-central-med-yKqSc7.
69 Frontex, Operation Themis (Italy), August 19, 2019, https://frontex.europa.eu/
along-eu-borders/main-operations/operation-themis-italy-/.
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need to be better equipped to prevent criminal groups that try to enter 
the EU undetected. This is crucial for the internal security of the Europe-
an Union”70. Although the operational area of JO Themis was extended 
eastwards, spanning the Central Mediterranean Sea from Italy to Libya, 
Egypt, Turkey and Albania, the critical for JO Triton region, between the 
island of Lampedusa and Libya’s territorial waters was largely deactivat-
ed. The declaration in June 2018 of a Libyan SAR zone in the Central 
Mediterranean, fostered by the European Commission which co-financed 
training of Libyan border guards by Frontex experts, reduced Frontex’s 
operational activities taking place close to Libyan shores. This had a di-
rect impact on SAR actions, regardless of the official declaration that 
“Operation Themis will continue to include search and rescue as a crucial 
component”71. However, it was made clear that: “One of the main dif-
ferences between Joint Operation Themis and its predecessor, Triton, is 
that Themis’s operational plan does not foresee a specific disembarkation 
point and that the operational area in the central Mediterranean has been 
reduced”72. Therefore, Frontex was no longer requested to support SAR 
activities close to Libyan shores. As part of JO Themis, Frontex officers 
assisted the national authorities in the hotspots in Italy in the registration 
of migrants, including screening, debriefing and fingerprinting. Since 
the mandate of the operation covered the collection of intelligence about 
criminal networks and identification of people smugglers, debriefing of-
ficers deployed by Frontex acquired intelligence about people-smuggling 
networks and other suspicious criminal elements73.
70 Frontex, Frontex launching new operation in Central Med, News Release, Febru-
ary 1, 2018, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-launching-new-
operation-in-central-med-yKqSc7.
71 Ibidem.
72 Frontex Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights, Sixth Annual Report, 2018, 
36, August 14, 2019, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Partners/Consultative_Forum_files/
Frontex_Consultative_Forum_annual_report_2018.pdf.
73 Although the use of intelligence tradecraft in dealing with migrants in hotspots has 
not been officially expressed by Frontex, we can assume with certainty that this practice has 
been applied during JO Themis, given the official task of the collection of intelligence and 
the experience of JO Poseidon Sea, which showed many similarities with JO Themis.
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The two joint operations coordinated by Frontex have shown some 
features typical for the EU’s extended borderland. Firstly, any EU agen-
cy engaged in operational activities has to take into account humanitari-
an aspects and security needs. Human and social factors which underpin 
mobility and transboundary diffusion of identities resonate strongly with 
policy-driven security imperatives. Secondly, the scale and intensity of 
Neo-nomadic movements assume a particular expression in the extended 
borderland, which makes the EU border agency particularly susceptible 
to politicisation and humanitarian validation of its agent power vis-a-vis 
migrants’ trajectories and borderlanders’ lifestyles. Thirdly, Frontex has 
tended to security-driven activities not only because of its politically-es-
tablished formal mandate but also in reaction to negative consequences of 
unrestrained mobility and largely uncontrolled migratory flows in the ex-
tended borderland. Hence, exclusionary attitude to migrants has resulted 
from an intelligence-led threat assessment and security concerns over an 
escalation of the migration crisis.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The eruption of neo-nomadic mobility in the EU’s extended bor-
derland during the migration crisis of 2015-2016 has brought to light 
a strong link between regional integration, local  identities and emotional 
(humanitarian) re-actions. It has reflected a simple truth expressed by Rosi 
Bradiotti in 2010: “we have to stop looking at immigration as a  prob-
lem and see immigration as simply the fact of globalisation. We have to 
start from the fact that the world will never be culturally and ethnically 
homogenous again: that world is over”74. Developments in the Central 
Mediterranean part of the EU’s borderland have shown how challenging 
for the EU institutions, and especially the EU’s relevant body in charge 
of border management, namely the European Border and Coast Guard 
74 Sara Saleri, On nomadism: Interview with Rosi Braidotti, July 15, 2019,  http://
dancekiosk-hamburg.de/uploads/European%20Alternatives:%20On%20nomad-
ism%20Interview%20with%20Rosi%20Braidotti%20-%20George%20Maci-
unas%20Foundation%20Inc..pdf.
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Agency, the dynamics of overall mobility and specific traits of neo-no-
madism can be. Frontex’s agent power had to split into exclusionary and 
inclusionary elements which stimulated the emergence and functioning of 
the post-functionalist mobility ecosystem that had emerged with the rise 
of the migratory tide in the early 2010s.
Frontex as a security actor has been exposed to numerous, and quite 
often contradictory, pressures from the EU Member States,  public audi-
ence and NGOs active in SAR operations. The two joint operations at the 
Mediterranean Sea, Triton and Themis, have proven that the consequences 
of neo-nomadism have extended beyond the EU’s external borderland and 
activated defence mechanisms in the EU and some of its Member States. 
Therefore, a  shift from the mixed inclusionary/exclusionary character of 
Frontex’s agent power to the clearly exclusionary ingredients of the agen-
cy’s activities has proven that the management of security in the extend-
ed borderland, in accordance with the post-functionalist interpretation, 
has produced an imbalance in working out and implementing efficient 
and politically feasible solutions to the problem of the migratory crisis. In 
addition, Frontex has been gradually tasked with law-enforcement activi-
ties, which stem from the security policy improvement technique of treat-
ing neo-nomads as potential criminals (the crimmigration effect, or the 
crime-migration nexus)75. As a result, Frontex has deployed and developed 
supranational surveillance mechanisms and police cooperation schemes 
which have made this agency resemble a law enforcement institution76.
The EU’s extended borderland has become a  test bed for Frontex’s 
agent power in terms of its capacity to effectively cope with Neo-nomadic 
mobility and diversity. The nomad space stretching across the Mediterra-
nean Sea, distributed among state actors, humanitarian NGOs and itin-
erant communities, has produced numerous challenges and demanding 
tasks for the EU’s border agency. Frontex’s resources have been employed 
75 Katja Franko Aas, “‘Crimmigrant’ bodies and bona fide travelers: Surveillance, 
citizenship and global governance”, Theoretical Criminology, 15(2011): 333.  DOI: 
10.1177/1362480610396643.
76 Fabrice Leggeri, Frontex’s Executive Director, declared in February 2018: “I would 
not object if you define us as a law enforcement agency at EU level.” Quoted in: Niko-
laj Nielsen, Frontex: Europe’s new law enforcement agency?, EU Observer, February 22, 
2018, https://euobserver.com/justice/141062.
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both for surveillance and early warning at the external borders as well as 
reactive actions in the face of criminal activities. The latter aspect of Fron-
tex’s agent power needs a  separate analysis. It must be mentioned here 
that the EU’s border and coast agency may be authorised to use coercive 
means, including weapons, subject to specific rules of engagement. Some 
documents have been made available, as a result of information requests, 
accidental releases and leaks, evidencing incidents involving the use of 
firearms during Frontex-coordinated joint operations. Due to the public 
security clause, usually employed in order to justify the classification of 
relevant documents or their parts, a factual record of the use of force, being 
a radical aspect of Frontex’s agent power, has been made unavailable so far.
The modes of enforcing by Frontex its agent power, seen during its 
joint operations in the Mediterranean “extended borderland”, have prov-
en its aspirations towards performing an essential role in the EU’s efforts 
to handle the Neo-nomadic mobility which erupted during the migra-
tion crisis of 2015-2016. A further extension of Frontex’s powers, already 
planned by the European Commission77, should be closely observed in the 
context of the transformation of the EU’s border security strategies and 
policies.
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